Are We Fighting the Afghan War the Best Possible Way?

BY KARL GUSTAVE

Are we really fighting the Afghanistan war the best possible way? I don't think so.

U.S. Boosts Afghan Surge

First, let me say that I fully support the war efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I always have. I believe both of these campaigns are without doubt legitimate and justified. Furthermore, the troops have my 100% backing with regard to their successes, gains and positive impact around the world regardless if you're talking about the different theaters in Asia, Europe or the Middle East. There's not much else that I love hearing about more than when I hear about our guys & gals kickin the bad guys butts.

At the risk of being labeled an arm chair commander (I'll accept that), I really believe we are fighting the Afghanistan war the wrong way. First, I think it's hard to see things from the best perspective when you're on the inside looking out, so that may give those on the outside (like me) a unique view that cannot be seen by those thinking 'inside the box'. Second, I've always been a student of history, especially when it comes to the history of conflict. I strongly believe in the adage by George Santayana  "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it", it seems we all have a hard time remembering these words of wisdom. And third, I'm a career military person, having retired from the U.S. Navy with 18 and a half years of honorable service. Now, I realize that this does not give me any real qualification for saying that the war in Afghanistan is not being fought correctly, as a matter of fact, I think that plus $4.50 will buy me a grande latte from Starbucks. But I suppose that it boils down to the fact that when you see something that is so obvious or even self evident as to be going in the wrong direction, that one must speak out. I believe that is the case with the war in Afghanistan.

Where are we going wrong? Well, to begin with, we're making the same mistake that we made in theVietnam War (1963 - 1975) and the Soviets made in their own version of the Afghanistan War (1979 - 1989) which finally proved to be futile for them also. Keep in mind that the Soviets were never burdened with the political and public relations problems that we were during the Vietnam conflict. The problem we are faced with in Afghanistan is not the fact that we are fighting there so much as how we are fighting the war. History has constantly demonstrated that a large scale conventional force cannot win against an unconventional force on their own turf. This is not to say that we cannot stay there indefinitely, we can stay there as long as we are willing to pay the price in resources which includes our soldiers lives and the associated monetary cost. But history has shown that we cannot ever win this type of war, unless we are prepared to go a very long time, maybe 40, 50 or even 100 years. The first evidence that proves this point in the history of the United States was the American Revolutionary War, when the British Crown could not sustain their war effort against the American colonists, or the rebel forces. This also proved to be a futile effort as is the case throughout history. It was not so much that we (the colonists) won as it was they (the British) were not willing to expend their own assets indefinitely on a continuous conveyor belt of death fashion. The British could have continued to send over troops had they been willing to pay the price, but in their cost benefit analysis they just could not justify doing so.  it's important to realize that there has never been a case (that I'm aware of) in the historical record where a large scale conventional force has been ultimately victorious against an indigenous or supported insurgent force that fights using guerilla tactics as their primary means of combat.

Also keep in mind that we cannot assume that what worked in Iraq, such as the 'Iraqi Surge' will work in Afghanistan as it clearly did in Iraq. These two battlefields are apples and oranges and have almost nothing in common. First and foremost, the people and societies of Iraq reside in a completely different time and era which is separated by several centuries maybe as much as a millennium. Iraq is one of if not the most highly developed country in the middle east excluding Israel. Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan (with a literacy rate of 28.1%) is trapped in the 8th century. The people of Afghanistan live in a feudalistic tribal oriented culture that is more akin to the dark ages than any contemporary society, and even less a comparison to any western culture or nation. I'm not saying this as a derogatory comment, simply that that is who the Afghan people are as a matter of fact. This is what allowed Bin Laden to come into that country and cultivate the Taliban and Al Quida so easily. And there is no simple way to bring these people into the 19th century, much less the 21st century. It will take them decades if not centuries to drag them kicking and screaming into our age and era, which we should not be trying to do. We all have our process and time and we have no business trying to froce them into a time machine to get them up to date. Besides, it will not work.

So, what is the answer to the problem? What is the method we should be using to fight our enemies in Afghanistan? The answer is to stay in Afghanistan. That's right, you heard me right. We should stay in Afghanistan, but we should also fight the enemy in a completely different way. The number one difference in how we should be doing this is the troop level and the type of forces being utilized to combat the bad guys. As I mentioned before, the problem is the types of forces and tactics we are employing against their guerilla forces. A large conventional force cannot win against a small unconventional force, so we need to employ a small unconventional force against their unconventional forces. This is sometimes referred to as 'Low Intensity Conflict' or a 'LIC' strategy. The truth of the matter is that we could control the entire country and achieve or national strategic goals with regard to Afghanistan with between 3,000 and 5,000 special operations troops and a squadron of 'Predator & Global Hawk' drones. Air support could and should be supplied by aircraft carrier in the North Indian Ocean and allied nations to the North and West of Afghanistan. This would give us the ability to eliminate any enemy insurgent training facility or command complex that might spring up once our intelligence has detected them. This would normally be verified by a small spec-ops team (usually at night and without detection), before employing ordnance via aircraft or drone. In certain circumstance, covert sensors could be used to detect enemy routes of movement and spec-ops teams could be used to verify the presence of enemy activity and weapons caches.

The idea is to NOT have a presence in Afghanistan. We need to be there to accomplish our goals of preventing training camps and command posts from being there and the ability to operate there. But we need to do it in a way that it will appear that we are not there. We need to be unseen and have the lowest impact possible on that country. We need to be ghosts. This will allow us to accomplish our goals, and give the enemy a minimum of targets (our soldiers), and will also have the least possible negative impact on the people and the natural development of their culture and society.

U.S. Boosts Afghan Surge